Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), Minnesota employers have been unsure of
their obligations to disabled workers who can not be
accommodated in their present jobs. While many
believed (with backing from some federal courts) that
they only needed to allow these employees to compete
with other applicants for vacant jobs, others felt (with
support from other federal courts) that they were
required to place these employees in vacant jobs
ahead of more qualified applicants.
A ruling hot off the press from the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals (which covers Minnesota) finally
seems to have resolved this question. Read on to
learn which side of this long-standing debate finally
prevailed, and what questions still remain.
The accommodation issue
Pam Huber worked in the Wal-Mart grocery as an
Order Filler earning $13.00 per hour (including shift
differential bonus). Unfortunately, she suffered an
injury to her arm and hand that prevented her from
performing the essential functions of the job, even
with accommodations. As a result, she asked to be
reassigned to the vacant Router job, a position of
equivalent pay and status as the Order Filler. Wal-Mart
refused to place her there automatically, citing its
policy of hiring only the most qualified applicants for
vacant jobs. Therefore, Huber had to compete for the
Router job with other applicants, and ultimately lost
out on the job to a non-disabled applicant. Wal-Mart
did, however, place Huber into a maintenance job at
another facility at roughly half the wage that she had
been earning.
Huber sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), claiming that she was entitled to be placed
directly into the open Router job as a legally required
accommodation. Wal-Mart filed a motion for
summary judgment (early dismissal), contending that
the ADA did not require them to abandon their
legitimate, nondiscriminatory
policy
of hiring the most
qualified applicant for
all job vacancies.
Huber also filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the Arkansas trial court granted. Wal-Mart then appealed to the
Eighth Circuit.
Noting that they had never actually faced this
question before, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ruled in Wal-Mart’s favor.
They began their analysis by reviewing ADA’s requirements
for reasonable accommodation, which include:
[J]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
A question of balance
The judges then observed that other federal circuits
had looked into this question and had come up with
conflicting answers. For example, the Tenth Circuit,
which covers the western plains states, ruled that the
ADA required employers to place disabled workers
directly into existing vacancies rather than making
them compete with other applicants. The judges took
particular note of the following excerpt from a Tenth
Circuit decision:
[I]f the reassignment language merely requires
employers to consider on an equal basis with all other
applicants an otherwise qualified existing employee
with a disability for reassignment to a vacant position,
that language would add nothing to the obligation not
to discriminate, and would thereby be redundant. . . .Thus, the reassignment obligation must mean
something more than merely allowing a disabled
person to compete equally with the rest of the world
for a vacant position.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, which covers
Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan, has ruled that direct
placement is not required, as explained in this excerpt
from one of their decisions:
The reassignment provision makes clear that the
employer must also consider the feasibility of
assigning the worker to a different job in which his
disability will not be an impediment to full
performance, and if the reassignment is feasible and
does not require the employer to turn away a superior
applicant, the reassignment is mandatory.
The judges also cited approvingly a Fifth Circuit decision
(covering Texas and other southern states) observing
that “[t]he [ADA] does not require affirmative action in
favor of individuals with disabilities. It merely prohibits
employment discrimination against qualified individuals
with disabilities, no more and no less.”
The Eighth Circuit judges ultimately concluded that
the ADA did not require direct placement into vacant
jobs, thereby siding with the neighboring Seventh
Circuit. They reiterated that the ADA is not an “affirmative action statute” and does not require an
employer to violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
policy of the employer to hire the most qualified
candidate. Indeed, they observed that a contrary
ruling would violate a basic premise of all
discrimination laws since it would require an
employment decision to be based on an employee’s
protected classification. As such, Wal-Mart was not
required to place Huber into a vacant Router job
ahead of more qualified applicants.
The appeals court then ruled that Wal-Mart had
actually satisfied its obligation to accommodate Huber
when they placed her into the maintenance job.
Though not an ideal match, nor the accommodation
that Huber desired, it was a reasonable decision
(presumably since it was certainly preferable to no job
at all). Pam Huber, v Wal-Mart Stores Inc (8th Circuit
No. 06-2238, May 30, 2007).
What do we learn?
This long-awaited decision resolves an important
issue for Minnesota employers, but it does not tell the
whole story. While direct placement is not required,
how much must an employer do for a disabled
employee to meet the accommodation obligation? Is
it enough to let them compete on an equal footing
with other applicants or must we do something to
facilitate the application for the vacant job? How long
must an employer give the disabled employee to find
a suitable vacancy? These questions await answers
from future cases but at least we now know how
much is too much.
Remember also that while this is the
interpretation of federal law, the Minnesota
courts may view things differently under
our state Human Rights Act.
Minnesota courts look to federal interpretations for
guidance but have been known to arrive at different
conclusions so nothing is certain. Still, this case gives
us a solid foundation for concluding that Minnesota
employers may continue to follow a practice of hiring
the best person for an open job regardless of protected
class status, including disability.
